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Abstract
In order to find a specific type of malware/attack which is related to
GSM frequency, we propose an algorithm according to the most essential
characteristics of this malware. At first, detect whether or not there exists
a specific thread in the memory. And then, the generated binary strings
will be tried to be matched with the one in the target computer. At last,
determine whether this threat occurs or not. Furthermore, we study the
effective of the new method via some simulations.
1 Introduction
Intrusion detection (ID) is an important network security technique, which de-
tects whether there exist intrusion attacks in the network through the use of
some technical means. If an attack is detected, the ID alerts the user. In fact,
the attack and the defense is always a pair of contradiction in the network se-
curity. Along with the development of network defense techniques including
intrusion detection, the network attack technique is also escalating. On the one
hand, the variant of the known attacks makes the traditional intrusion detec-
tion system more difficult to detect. On the other hand, some network attacks
have occured in the last three years, which was viewed as impossible by the
traditional secure opinion. For exanmple, an air-gapped networks is no longer
secure under the network attack. And there are a number of techniques that
allow an attacker to theft information from an air-gapped computer at present.
Since 2013, some new intrusion techniques are emerging. And these types of
attacks have been developed to theft data from a air-gapped computer by using
the thermal emission [1], electromagnetic radiation [2], ultrasonic [3][4], or USB
devices [5]. Traditional intrusion detection methods can do nothing about these
attacks, including GSMem, a malware for air-gapped computers. In this paper.
we aim to deal with this problem.
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Figure 1: GSMem attack schematic
2 The GSMem Attack Model
Air-Gapped Networks are physically and logically isolated from the public In-
ternet, and this section describes ”GSMem” attacks that exfiltrate data from
air-gapped networks. ”GSMem” is a bifurcated malware, which consists of two
parts, part of the program is installed on the desktop computer to achieve the
function of the signal transmitter, the other part of the program running in the
baseband mobile phone to achieve the function of the signal receiver. The desk-
top computer generates the electromagnetic radiation (EMR) of the handset
baseband-compatible GSM band by calling the memory-related CPU instruc-
tions [6][7][8][9][10]. By increasing the amplitude of the electromagnetic waves
using the multi-channel memory architecture function, thereby modulating the
(binary) information desired to be stepped into the amplified electromagnetic
signals. A standard GSM mobile phone by modifying the baseband processor
to receive and decode these amplified emission of electromagnetic signals, re-
sulting in data containing user privacy. The following describes the principle of
the transmitter and the receiver in ”GSMem” attack.
the core principles and key steps of GSMem attacks are shown in Figure 1.
3 An Algorithm for detecting GSMem
The transmitter in the GSMem attack model that operates on a desktop com-
puter, and the transmitting program has a small memory and CPU footprint,
making the activities of the transmitter easier to hide and difficult to be found.
The main reasons are: 1©In terms of memory consumption, the program con-
sumes merely 4K of memory allocated on the heap. 2©In terms of CPU intake,
the transmitter runs on a single, independent thread. 3©At the OS level, the
transmitting process can be executed with no elevated privileges (e.g., root or
admin). 4©Finally, the code consists of bare CPU instructions, avoiding API calls
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Figure 2: Algorithm 1
to escape certain malware scanners.
In short, the transmission code evades common security mechanisms such as
API monitoring and resource tracing, making it hard to detect.
However, the transmission program is difficult to detect does not mean that
can not be detected. According to the most essential characteristic of the trans-
mitter in the GSMem attack model, we propose the following algorithm for
GSMem attack detection from the call of MOVNTDQ instruction. The new
algorithm consists of a main algorithm and a sub-algorithm. Since the GSMem
is a bifurcated malware and the transmitter is installed on a desktop computer,
the main algorithm starts with the detection of the transmitter in the GSMem
attack model.
The critical to the GSMem attack model is that the transmitter uses the
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Figure 3: Algorithm 2
MOVNTDQ instruction to generate the electromagnetic signal to transmit data
(ie, ”1” and ”0” in the amplitude of the electromagnetic waves emissions) by the
attack principle. According to the nature of this principle, the existence of the
thread can call MOVNTDQ start detection. First, the new algorithm detects
whether there is such a thread in memory, which is done by sub-algorithm
1. Of course, the new algorithm must exclude the normal use of MOVNTDQ
instruction thread. Next, the new algorithm divides the time ”T” one by one
into 1ms to 1000ms according to the ”B-ASK” modulation principle of the
transmitter in the GSMem attack model. The binary string generated by a
single program loop in the algorithm (including the preamble sequence ”1010”)
matches the binary string of sensitive information. Once the two binary strings
match, that is found GSMem attack, and the attacker is sending high-level
sensitive information, then the algorithm immediately alarm!
4 Simulation Experiments
In this section, Matlab is employed to conduct our simulations. And the process
of the algorithm is simulated in this platform.
4.1 Experiment Setup
First of all, we start from the basic principle of algorithm detection, simulation
thread calls MOVNTDQ, simulation of the main algorithm and sub-algorithm
implementation, the specific experimental steps are as follows:
(1) Input the string of sensitive information, and convert the string into binary
form.
(2) Electromagnetic waves sampling. We according to the literature [3] to
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Figure 4: abnormal electromagnetic waves
provide normal use of desktop computers and GSMem attacks in the case of
amplitude-frequency diagram, sampling the frequency and amplitude of the
electromagnetic waves emissions from the normal and the GSMem attack, this
provides accurate raw data for this experiment. More precisely, it is a lot of raw
data about normal behavior and attack behavior.
(3) The simulation thread periodically calls MOVNTDQ instruction. We simu-
late the electromagnetic waves emitted by the computer at the moment. If the
frequency and amplitude of the emitted electromagnetic waves (sampled from
(2)) fall within the range of the anomalous electromagnetic waves (sampled from
(2)) emanating from the transmitter in the GSMem attack model at the current
moment. The thread is considered to have invoked the MOVNTDQ instruction
and continues the detect (proceed to (4)).
(4) We use the string matching principle of sub-algorithm 3 in the new algorithm
to detect whether sensitive information is exfiltrated in the thread regular use
of MOVNTDQ instruction. Specifically, according to the time slice one by one
to generate the binary string in the algorithm and the binary string of sensitive
information in the step (1) to match, if the match is successful, we think that
find an attack, immediately alarm!
4.2 Experimental results
If a computer is currently running radiated electromagnetic waves in the GSMem
emitter radiated from the range of abnormal electromagnetic waves, the results
shown in Figure 4. The figure shows the frequency and amplitude of the anoma-
lous electromagnetic waves, which means that there is a possibility that a sus-
pect attack uses this frequency and amplitude to transmit information. If you
further detect illegal call MOVNTDQ instruction, the results shown in Figure
5, means that the possibility of suspected attacks increased. Thereafter, if the
binary string matches successfully, the result is shown in Figure 6, at this time
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Figure 5: found thread calls the MOVNTDQ instruction
Figure 6: Successful string matching
it means that find an attack!
5 Conclusions
The main result of this paper is Algorithm 1, which aims to detect GSMem.
This is the target of the new approach.
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